Introduction
It is never easy, if even possible, to put a precise date on the beginning of a new field. Still, if one were to choose a year for the origin of game theory, it would surely be 1928, with von Neumann's fundamental paper of that year ( [26, 1928] ). Von Neumann wanted to find the best way to play a game of strategy:
n players S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n are playing a given game of strategy, G. How must one of the participants, S m , play in order to achieve a most advantageous result? ( [26, 1928, p.13 
])
To formulate the question in its essential form, von Neumann introduced the concept of a strategy -i.e., a complete plan of play -for each player. The task for player S m is now to pick one of his strategies "without knowing the choices of the others" ( [26, 1928, p.17] ). Von Neumann said that this lack of knowledge was built in:
[I]t is inherent in the concept of "strategy" that all information about the actions of the participants and the outcomes of "draws" [i.e., moves by Nature] a player is able to obtain or infer is already incorporated in the "strategy." Consequently, each player must choose his strategy in complete ignorance of the choices of the rest of the players and of the results of the "draws." ( [26, 1928, p.19 
Players might observe moves by other players and by Nature during the course of a game, but, by definition, they cannot observe other players' strategies.
One might think that this feature of strategic analysis creates an insurmountable obstacle. In all but the simplest games, the best strategy for one player to choose varies with the strategies the other players choose. If the latter choices are a matter of "complete ignorance," then there seems to be no clear way for the first player to make a good choice.
Von Neumann proposed a solution to this problem: This is his famous maximin criterion, which goes as follows. Ann chooses a strategy that yields her the highest guaranteed payoff. Suppose there are two players: Ann and Bob. For each strategy that she can choose, Ann supposes that Bob will, on his side, choose a strategy that is the worst for her. She then chooses a strategy that yields the highest such worst payoff -in other words, her highest guaranteed payoff. Bob chooses a strategy according to the same criterion.
By the time we come to von Neumann and Morgenstern [28, 1944] , von Neumann's maximin criterion had been extended to a complete theory for n-player general-sum games. Each subset ("coalition") of players jointly chooses strategies, under the worst-case assumption about how the complementary set of players chooses. This is the cooperative game model of von Neumann and Morgenstern.
Nash [16, 1951] took us back to the game model (the non-cooperative model) in which players choose strategies individually, not jointly. Within this setting, he took game theory down a very different road. He supposed that Ann's strategy is one that she might optimally choose, if she actually knew Bob's chosen strategy. Likewise, Bob's strategy is one that he might optimally choose, if he actually knew Ann's chosen strategy. (This, of course, is the concept of Nash equilibrium.) Nash banished the uncertainty about strategies, which was, in von Neumann's view, a fundamental characteristic of games.
Epistemic game theory (EGT) is concerned with non-cooperative game theory, in which players choose strategies individually. But, whereas mainstream non-cooperative game theory has followed Nash, EGT puts uncertainty about strategies center-stage. In this way, it really goes back to von Neumann's view of games and reconstructs non-cooperative game theory accordingly. We will come back to cooperative theory later.
Epistemic Game Theory
In EGT, in line with von Neumann's approach, a game is pictured as a collection of decision problems under uncertainty, one for each player. Unlike von Neumann's approach, however, a player's decision criterion is typically not maximin, but the less conservative one of maximization of expected payoff. Under this criterion, each player formulates a probability distribution over which strategy each of the other players chooses, and chooses a strategy to maximize his expected payoff under his distribution. We will say more about other decision criteria later.
This approach raises a key question: What constraints (if any) should be placed on the probability distributions the players employ in their expected-payoff calculations? A good first definition of EGT is that it studies various answers that one might give to this question, and works out the consequences for how games are played.
For example, we might put no restrictions on the probability distributions. This will be the case if we assume that each player is rational, but nothing more. Each player has his own entirely unrestricted probability distribution over the strategies chosen by the other players, and maximizes with respect to this distribution. Such a distribution represents the player's own subjective (what Savage [22, 1954, p.3] called "personalistic") view of the likelihood of various choices that the other players can make.
But, EGT begins to take on its characteristic form when we go further and assume not only that each player is rational, but also that each player thinks the other players are rational. That is, we now ask that Ann not only forms a probability distribution over Bob's strategy choices (and chooses her strategy accordingly), but also that, for each of Bob's strategies on which she puts positive probability, she produces a probability distribution over her own strategy choices under which the strategy in question for Bob is optimal for him. Notice that, at this point, we have arrived at the need for a mathematical structure for talking about probability distributions (what Ann thinks about Bob's choice of strategy) and probability distributions over probability distributions (what Ann thinks Bob thinks about her choice of strategy).
We can go further in this direction: Ann is rational, thinks Bob is rational, and thinks Bob thinks she is rational. And so on. The limiting case -the infinite conjunction of all such finite-length "Ann thinks Bob thinks . . . is rational" conditions -is called the assumption of "rationality and common belief in rationality" in EGT. To date, much of the focus of the field has been on answering the question of which strategy choices by players are consistent with this assumption. The question turns out to be much trickier then one might first think.
Theory or Language?
Let's pause and ask a question about the nature of EGT. Is it a full-fledged theory? a language? something else? At this point in its development, EGT seems best described as a mathematical language. It provides a way of capturing certain intuitive concepts (rationality, beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . ) so that they can be put to work in formulating and analyzing strategic situations. But, as yet, EGT is devoid of empirical content. For this reason, it cannot yet be considered a full theory. For progress on this front, we must look beyond the mathematics.
One very promising potential source of empirical content for EGT is the area of social neuroscience called "theory of mind" (Premack and Woodruff [18, 1978] ). This area studies the ability of humans and other species to represent the mind of a fellow member of their species in terms of the latter's desires, intentions, and beliefs. (See Singer [24, 2009] for more on the definition of this concept and for a survey of the current state of knowledge concerning the underlying brain mechanisms. Adolphs [1, 2010] has an interesting discussion of links between social neuroscience and other disciplines, including economics and computer science.) Human infants acquire the ability to form beliefs about what other people believe, and this appears to be more or less the human cognitive limit. Even adult humans appear to have trouble with higher-level reasoning. (These findings are undoubtedly sensitive to context. For a recent study, which discusses context dependence, see Goodie, Doshi, and Young [10, 2010] .)
Data of this kind can be expressed in the EGT formalism, which will then begin to take on the shape of a full theory. This has not been the flavor of the field in its early phase, which has focused on the limiting case of common belief rather than on low-level finite-order beliefs. The language can express these latter cases, too. Interestingly, there are indications that studying these cases may be harder and can lead to quite different answers. Brandenburger and Friedenberg [8, 2013] shows that, for a given game, the implication of imposing rationality and mth-order belief in rationality, however large m might be, can differ from the implication of imposing rationality and common belief of rationality. There is a 'discontinuity at infinity. ' Finding solid connections between EGT and empirics -in a number of areas, no doubt, and not just in social neuroscience -is both a timely and an exciting avenue. We will say a little more about empirics in the final section of this Introduction.
Limits in Principle
It turns out that even if we lift all practical limits on levels of reasoning in games, there are limits in principle. Chapter 1 in this book shows that any model of beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , of a certain kind must have a 'hole' in it; not all possible beliefs can be present. A so-called complete belief model does not exist.
Such results -on what is impossible even in principle -arise in various fields. In naive set theory, there was Russell's Paradox ("the set of all sets that are not members of themselves"). Indeed, the non-existence of a complete belief model can be viewed as a game-theoretic analog of Russell's Paradox. In computer science, there is the distinction between computability and computational complexity. The first topic considers the limits to what can be computed in principle, even with unbounded resources. The second studies what can be computed tractably -say, in polynomial time. (Papadimitriou [17, 1993] is a standard introduction.)
In both these other fields, the impossibility results came first. In EGT, the order was reversed. First, various models of all possible beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , were constructed. The earliest such models were built by Armbruster and Böge [4, 1979] and Böge and Eisele [6, 1979] , followed by Mertens and Zamir [14, 1985] . Chapter 2 presents another early model of all possible beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . .
The work in Chapter 1 came later. It makes clear that in these models of all possible beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , the word "all" must be understood in a restricted fashion, since impossibility is avoided.
Belief models borrow the concept of "type" that Harsanyi brilliantly introduced in his pioneering study ([11, 1967-8] ) of uncertainty in games. In EGT, each player has a set of possible types, where each type is associated with a probability distribution over the possible strategies and types for the other players. Beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , can be deduced from types, which makes the latter a very convenient element of the language of game theory. Without Harsanyi's insight, it would have been much harder for EGT to get off the ground. But, even though he came very close, Harsanyi did not quite initiate EGT. His interest was in uncertainty about the structure of the game -principally, about the payoffs of the players. Like Nash, he was not interested in uncertainty about strategies. In fact, Harsanyi's concepts were more powerful than the use to which he himself put them.
Fundamental Theorem of Epistemic Game Theory
Once a foundation for belief models (albeit, restricted belief models) was established, it became possible to tackle the question: What does the epistemic condition of rationality and common belief in rationality (RCBR) imply for how a game will be played? We already mentioned the importance of other -less 'extreme' -epistemic conditions. But, the field began with the extreme case, and this is how a lot of the language has been developed.
At first blush, the question has a clear answer. There are layers to the question, though, as we shall see. Here is the first answer. If each player is rational, then none will play a so-called dominated strategy (since no probability distribution can make a dominated strategy optimal). But, then, if each player also believes that the other players are rational, no player will play a strategy that is dominated only after all dominated strategies have been deleted from the original game. And so on. Under RCBR, then, each player will choose an iteratively undominated (IU) strategy.
In fact, this is not quite a complete answer, even as a first answer, because we want a converse, too. A simple converse would go something like this: Given a game and an IU strategy for each player, we can build a belief model so that these strategies are consistent with RCBR in the model. With this, we can say that the epistemic condition of RCBR not only implies that IU strategies will be played, but actually identifies this set (and no smaller set) of strategies. We get a characterization of the epistemic condition of RCBR.
This characterization result -which we can call the Fundamental Theorem of EGT -has been proved a number of times in a variety of forms. Chapter 3 gives one such early treatment, including what appears to be the first published treatment of a converse. Friedenberg and Keisler [9, 2011] give state-of-the-art versions of the characterization result.
Here is another layer to the question. To explain, let's consider three players: Ann, Bob, and Charlie. Charlie thinks that Ann and Bob choose their strategies independently. (Remember: We are doing non-cooperative game theory.) Does this mean that Charlie's probability distribution over Ann's strategy choice and Bob's strategy choice must be independent -i.e., must be a product distribution? The answer is no, because this neglects the possibility of common-cause correlation. Even though Ann and Bob choose independently, there could be variables affecting their choices that are correlated. Indeed, in EGT, such variables are right in front of us: they are Ann's and Bob's beliefs about the game. Charlie can think that Ann's strategy choice and Bob's strategy choice are correlated, if he thinks that Ann's and Bob's beliefs are correlated.
This leads to the question: What does the epistemic condition of RCBR imply for how a game will be played, when we allow for common-cause correlation? Chapter 4 shows that the answer, this time, is not the IU strategies, but a strictly smaller set of strategies. In other words, there are IU strategies that rely on too much correlation -on correlation that cannot arise through the mechanism of correlated beliefs. What exactly is this smaller set? At the moment, the question is open. We do not know what the Fundamental Theorem of EGT looks like under this kind of correlation.
This is a good indication of how young a field EGT is. This is just one of a good number of very basic questions in EGT to which answers we don't yet have answers.
Epistemic vs. Ontic Views
Return for a moment to Nash's development of game theory. If EGT is the broad language for describing and analyzing strategic situations we said it is, then, in particular, we should be able to express the idea of Nash equilibrium in the language. Chapter 5 is an attempt to do exactly this.
Here is the specific question: What epistemic conditions on a game imply that the players will play a Nash equilibrium? There is an easy answer for pure strategies and a deeper answer for mixed strategies. For pure strategies, the answer is essentially the one give earlier -that each player knows the strategies chosen by the other players. In epistemic belief models, the condition becomes: Each player has a correct belief about the other players' strategy choices. Formally, each player assigns probability 1 to the actual strategies chosen. Of course, there is also the condition that each player is rational.
These conditions apply to pure strategies. They could also apply to mixed-strategy equilibria, if we think of mixed strategies classically -that is, as choices from the set of randomizations over pure strategies. But, there is a natural epistemic question: Can a mixed strategy be turned on its head, so to speak, and viewed as representing other players' uncertainty about that player's choice of pure strategy?
Let's borrow some very useful terminology from physics -specifically, from the area of quantum mechanics. The "ontic" view of a quantum state is that it describes an objective reality of a physical system, while the "epistemic" view is that the state describes the state of knowledge of an observer of the system (see Spekkens [25, 2007] ).
What is the epistemic vs. ontic view of mixed strategies? As in the Fundamental Theorem of EGT, there is, again, a big distinction between games with two players and games with three or more players. One reason is the same as before: Charlie can think that Ann's and Bob's choices of strategy are independent or correlated. Another reason, different from before, is that two players can agree or disagree about the probabilities they assign to a third player's choice of strategy: Ann and Bob can agree or disagree about Charlie. To obtain Nash equilibrium, we impose epistemic conditions that yield independence and agreement. This allows us to assign to each player, in a welldefined way, a commonly held probability distribution by all other players over that player's choice of strategy, where these distributions are combined in an independent manner. Add an appropriate epistemic condition on rationality, and these distributions, viewed as mixed strategies, constitute a Nash equilibrium.
A clear lesson of the epistemic analysis of equilibrium is that the conditions involved are very restrictive. Correlation and disagreement are the general case in EGT. In order to obtain Nash equilibrium, we have to rule them out, by finding epistemic conditions that do so.
Conventional and epistemic game theory proceed very differently. The starting point of the conventional theory is a so-called solution concept -almost always Nash equilibrium or one of its many variants. Usually said to be the embodiment of 'rational behavior' in some way or other, these solution concepts are used to analyze game situations. In EGT, the primitives are more basic. The very idea of rational behavior has to be defined. (Moreover, we have seen that, once it is carefully defined, rationality alone does not yield Nash equilibrium. Several additional conditions are involved.) We also have to specify what each player believes about other players' strategy choices, beliefs, rationality, etc. EGT is much more explicit than is conventional game theory about what is being assumed about the players in a game.
It is an intriguing fact that the ontic vs. epistemic issue arises both in game theory and in foundations of quantum mechanics (QM). Even more, von Neumann [27, 1932] was the first to analyze the issue in QM. Also, somewhat like the use of games in mathematics itself -think, for example, of the topic of determinacy in set theory -games have been become a useful device in quantum foundations. (The "Guess Your Neighbor's Input" game is a notable example; see Almeida et al. [2, 2010] .) Since EGT looks specifically at the ontic vs. epistemic issue, perhaps, game theory done this way will turn out to be particularly applicable to QM.
Invariance and Admissibility
Return to the Fundamental Theorem of EGT. The question was: What does the epistemic condition of rationality and common belief in rationality (RCBR) imply for how a game will be played? What we said earlier on this question still only scratches the surface.
Battigalli and Siniscalchi [5, 2002 ] made a major advance by extending investigation of the question beyond game matrices to game trees. In EGT, game trees pose a whole new level of complexity because players not only hold beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , but also revise these beliefs as the play of the game proceeds. They do so by conditioning on the observed events in the tree. But there is more. In probability theory, conditional probabilities are defined up to their value on probability-0 events. In EGT, however, the probability-0 events cannot be ignored because what one player may view as chance might be under the control of another player.
For example, Bob might assign probability 1 to Ann's making a move that does not reach him (i.e., does not give him the next move). In this case, his conditional distribution over what Ann might subsequently do, if she does, in fact, give Bob the next move, is undefined. This is not a problem from Bob's perspective, as his expected payoff does not depend on his move. Now, though, suppose that Ann thinks that Bob assigns probability 1 to her not giving him the next move. She still has to decide whether or not to give him the next move -the event is under her control. Her decision will depend on how she thinks Bob would react, and this depends on how she thinks Bob will update his probability distribution, conditional on the probability-0 event that she did give him the move. In sum, Ann needs a model of how Bob forms conditional probabilities even on events to which he assigns probability 0.
We have spelled this point out in detail, because it indicates the need for an extended nonKolmogorovian probability theory in game theory. It turns out that there is a tailor-made such theory, due to Rényi [19, 1955] . (Rényi's motivations were from statistics and physics. The game theory of his time had not been developed to the point where the motivation from this direction could have been apparent.) This is the theory that Battigalli and Siniscalchi beautifully developed and applied to games.
All of this is about game trees, where players make observations during the play of the game and revise their beliefs. But, remember that, for von Neumann, the concept of strategy was basic. By listing each player's possible strategies, we reduce a game tree to a game matrix, and then conduct the analysis (in von Neumann's case, maximin analysis) on the matrix.
Actually, it is not immediately obvious that von Neumann's approach can work. In general, more than one game tree reduces to a given game matrix. Perhaps, crucial information is lost in considering only the matrix. Implicitly, at least, von Neumann was assuming that no 'strategically relevant' information is lost.
This view was made explicit in the highly influential paper by Kohlberg and Mertens [13, 1986] , who proposed an invariance principle. They argued that if two trees reduce to the same matrix, then the analysis of the two trees must be the same. Not only is no 'strategically relevant' information lost in working with the matrix, but it also is essential to work with the matrix, they said. Otherwise, we risk having the analysis depend on which of several strategically equivalent trees we happen to have in front of us.
So, how does one perform an invariant analysis? The key turns out to be the admissibility (weak dominance) concept. A strategy is admissible in the matrix if and only if it is rational in any tree that reduces to that matrix. (For a precise statement and proof of this claim, see Brandenburger [7, 2007, p.488] .) Therefore, to build EGT in a manner that satisfies Kohlberg-Mertens invariance, we assume that each player adheres to an admissibility requirement.
Let us examine admissibility more closely. It is a standard result in decision theory that a strategy for Ann is admissible if and only if it maximizes her expected payoff under some probability distribution that puts strictly positive probability on each of Bob's possible strategy choices. This creates a puzzle, first observed by Samuelson [21, 1992] . Suppose that some of Bob's strategies are inadmissible (for him). Then, it seems that if Ann thinks that Bob adheres to the admissibility requirement, she will assign probability 0 to these strategies. The assumption that Ann adheres to the admissibility requirement (so that she assigns positive probability to all of Bob's strategies) appears to contradict the assumption that Ann thinks that Bob adheres to the admissibility requirement (so that she assigns probability 0 to some of Bob's strategies). Can we, in fact, do game theory with admissibility?
Chapter 6 offers a resolution of this puzzle. Ann is equipped not with one probability measure over Bob's strategy choices, but with a sequence of probability measures, which we called a lexicographic probability system (LPS). An LPS is used lexicographically in determining an optimal strategy: Pick those strategies that maximize expected payoff under the first probability measure. From this set, pick those strategies that maximize expected payoff under the second probability measure. And so on. The strategies for Bob that receive positive primary probability are considered infinitely more likely than the strategies that receive positive secondary probability, and so on. (This can be made into a formal statement, using infinitesimals.) This is the resolution of the puzzle. Ann need not assign probability 0 to any of Bob's strategies, but, she can consider some of them infinitely less likely than others.
This approach is given a foundation by starting with the standard Anscombe-Aumann [3, 1963] axiomatization of the expected payoff criterion, and modifying the axioms in order to obtain an LPS representation. Note that, again, we extend Kolmogorov probability theory in order to do game theory -this time, in order to do game theory in an invariant manner.
Chapter 7 defines an epistemic condition that is a lexicographic analog to the basic RCBR condition. Rationality relative to an LPS is defined in the way just explained. We also need a lexicographic analog to the concept of "assigns probability 1 to," which is how belief is formalized in ordinary probability theory. Say that Ann "assumes" (our term for the lexicographic case) an event if she considers all states in the event infinitely more likely than all states not in the event.
(Of course, the definition for infinite spaces needs more care.) With these ingredients, we can formulate the epistemic condition of "rationality and common assumption of rationality" (RCAR) and characterize it in terms of which strategies can then be played.
The characterization identifies a new solution concept on the matrix -call it a "self-admissible set" (SAS). Chapter 8 studies this solution concept in its own right, showing how it behaves in three very famous games -Centipede (Rosenthal [20, 1981] ), the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store (Selten [23, 1978] ) -and establishing various general properties.
Back to the main story: An important asymmetry has arisen at this point. The basic epistemic condition of RCBR is characterized by the set of iteratively undominated (IU) strategies. This is the Fundamental Theorem of EGT. The (more advanced) epistemic condition of RCAR is characterized by the SAS concept. But, by analogy with the first result, would we not expect RCAR to be characterized by the set of iteratively admissible (IA) strategies? The intuition is analogous (given that we have solved the Samuelson puzzle). If each player adheres to the admissibility requirement, then none will play an inadmissible strategy. But then, if each player also assumes that the other players adhere to the requirement, no player will play a strategy that is inadmissible after all inadmissible strategies have been deleted from the original game. And so on. Under RCAR, each player will choose an IA strategy.
This turns out to be wrong. The IA set constitutes one of the SAS's in a game, but, usually, a game has other (distinct) SAS's, too. One way to explain why this is so is that, unlike dominance, the admissibility concept involves a fundamental non-monotonicity.
To get the IA strategies from within EGT, we need to formulate the RCAR condition not in an arbitrary belief model, but in one of the 'large' belief models we talked about in the earlier section "Limits in Principle." There is more. A result in Chapter 7 shows that in a large belief model (where the idea of "large" is suitably captured), for any finite integer m, the condition of "rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality" is characterized by (m+1) rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies. (One round is for the rationality assumption, and m rounds are for mth-order assumption of rationality.) However, it is impossible to have RCAR (infinite levels) in such a structure. In some sense, the players are being to asked to think about too much. It appears that EGT imposes another limit in principle to reasoning in games. Having said this, some recent papers (see, in particular, Keisler and Lee [12, 2011] ) test the robustness of this impossibility result. This is another very open area in EGT.
Questions and Directions
As EGT has developed, it has led to some provocative questions about very basic ingredients of game theory. One such question is: What -really -is a game model?
Conventional game theory says that a game model is a game matrix or tree. EGT says nothis is only a partial model. A full game model consists of a matrix or tree together with a belief model -i.e., a space of possible beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , for each player. In other words, in EGT, a game model consists of a game in the classical sense, but also a model containing the beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , that each player might hold. EGT respects the 'trilogy' of decision theory: strategies, payoffs, and probabilities. A game model should include the players' probabilities over what they are uncertain about, in addition to their strategy sets and payoff functions.
What can be thought of as an output in conventional game theory becomes an input in EGT. Conventionally, we start with a Nash equilibrium -say, one in which Ann chooses the strategy Up and Bob chooses the strategy Left. We can associate beliefs with this pair of strategies: Ann assigns probability 1 to Bob's choosing Left and Bob assigns probability 1 to Ann's choosing Up. (The definition of Nash equilibrium does not require us to make this association, but it is a natural one to make.) The solution concept is interpreted as telling us what beliefs the players hold. In short, beliefs emerge as an output of the analysis.
In EGT, we cannot even begin analysis until we have specified the players' beliefs. Only once we have done so can we narrow down the strategy choices. This time, beliefs are an essential input into the analysis.
Where do we look for this input? What is underneath a belief model? For this, it seems we should look to outside factors, such as the environment in which strategic interaction takes place, the prior experiences of the players, their personalities, etc. Moving in this direction makes game theory much less self-contained as a discipline than it traditionally has been.
This causes mixed reactions. To some people, it is a big defect of EGT: It is not a complete theory. To others, it is a welcome end to a dubious enterprise of trying to build a complete theory of strategic interaction on the basis of 'pure reason' alone. Such aspects as context and history, among others, are now seen to matter. This issue has divided game theorists from early on. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [28, 1944] were firmly in the second camp:
[W]e shall in most cases observe a multiplicity of solutions. Considering what we have said about interpreting solutions as stable 'standards of behavior' this has a simple and not unreasonable meaning, namely that given the same physical background different 'established orders of society' or 'accepted standards of behavior' can be built. . . . ( [28, 1944, p .42]) (Admittedly, this was written in the context of cooperative theory, but, remember that cooperative theory was their general theory of n-player games.) If we understand the term "physical background" to refer to the game matrix (or tree), then von Neumann and Morgenstern believed that game theory should not attempt to give a unique answer based on this model alone. Nash [15, 1950] took the exact opposite view, and asked precisely for a unique answer from the matrix:
We proceed by investigating the question: what would be a 'rational' prediction of the behavior to be expected of rational[ly] playing the game in question? By using the principles that a rational prediction should be unique, that the players should be able to deduce and make use of it, and that such knowledge on the part of each player of what to expect the others to do should not lead him to act out of conformity with the prediction, one is led to the concept of a solution [viz., Nash equilibrium] defined before. ( [15, 1950]) We can sum up the issue this way: Game theory built on the matrix alone is indeterministic (von Neumann-Morgenstern) or deterministic (Nash) . EGT is clearly a theory of the first kind.
Here is another question about the basic ingredients of game theory: What is a player? Or, more precisely put, what is the appropriate unit of behavior? Once again, von Neumann-Morgenstern and Nash took different paths. In the von Neumann-Morgenstern cooperative theory, the notion of joint action by several players is basic. In Nash's non-cooperative theory, individual action is basic. The unit of behavior is, in the first case, a group, and, in the second case, an individual. EGT suggests that the boundary between the non-cooperative and cooperative theories is more blurry than one might think. In the section "Fundamental Theorem of Epistemic Game Theory," we explained that individual actions can become correlated via correlation of beliefs. We also said that the iteratively undominated (IU) strategies -a very basic object in non-cooperative game theory -contain more correlation than can be explained this way. What is this extra correlation? It is precisely joint action by players. (Chapter 4 gives more detail on this point.) Non-cooperative game theory turns out to include in it what is usually thought of as a distinguishing feature of cooperative theory. The boundary between the two branches of game theory appears to be less clear-cut than previously thought.
Let's now come back to the matter of the decision criterion that is attributed to the players in EGT. So far, the field has almost always assumed expected-payoff maximizing behavior. The main reason for this is a "one new thing at a time" philosophy. EGT is radically different from classical game theory in its rejection of the use of equilibrium as the starting point of analysis. It would be hard to get a clear view of the effect of this shift, if EGT made other changes at the same time. Since expected-payoff maximization is the assumption almost always made in the classical theory, EGT holds this part fixed. We can think of the approach as rather like conducting a controlled experiment, in which one variable is changed while the others remain fixed. Even maintaining the classical decision criterion, EGT turns out to be very different from classical game theory -as we have already glimpsed and as will become even clearer in the remainder of this book.
Still, it would be highly desirable to explore what happens if a non-classical decision criterion is used instead. Fortunately, EGT looks to be rather modular with respect to the decision criterion used. The hope is that much of the architecture of EGT -the concept of type, the inductive definitions of rationality, belief in rationality, etc. -should continue to work even if we 'plug in' a different decision criterion. Such an extension of EGT will be another way in which empirical content can be added to the field -by using decision theories that have better empirical underpinnings.
At various points in this Introduction, we have pointed to possible directions in which EGT could further develop. We have noted some very basic open questions in the field, which is still very young. We have also seen some unexpected consequences of the approach: EGT has prompted us to ask -or re-ask -some fundamental questions about the whole architecture of game theory. We believe this to be another virtue of the epistemic approach.
